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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff - Respondent, : Case No. 900456-CA 
vs. : Argument Priority 
Classification No. 11 
RONALD R. KOURY, : 
Defendant - Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2(a)-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE8 PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, based upon the unlawful search and seizure violative 
of the protections provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution? 
II. Did the District Court err in failing to find an agency 
relationship, where law enforcement officials had knowledge of and 
acquiesced to an informants entry into and search of a person's 
home? 
III. Did the District Court err in failing to extend the 
protections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, against unlawful 
searches and seizures, carried out vicariously by law enforcement 
officials? 
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Each of the above-stated issues is reviewable under a 
correction of error standard. Oates v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Ronald R. Koury, was charged pursuant to an 
Information filed on the 9th day of May, 1989, charging him with 
one felony and one class B misdemeanor occurring on or about May 
8, 1989, to wit: Count I: Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in violation of Section 58-37-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended and Count II: Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia in violation of Section 58-37(a)-5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended. (R. at 1). 
The Defendant, Ronald R. Koury, filed a Motion to Suppress in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, 
on the basis that all evidence was seized illegally, pursuant to 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in that such 
search and seizure was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and was in violation 
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. (R. at 
88 and 89). 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
on the 28th day of June 1990, on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. Said Motion was denied on grounds that Defendant had 
failed to meet the burden of proof. (R. 129 to 131). 
Defendant Ronald R. Koury filed a Petition for Permission to 
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Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, on the 26th day of August, 1990, with 
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at 167 to 161). Said Petition was 
granted on the 31st day of October, 1990. (R. at 168). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant, Ronald R. Koury, was arrested on May 8, 1989 
for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-1 and unlawful possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37(a)-5. (R. at 1). 
Said arrest was a result of a search warrant issued this same 
day, the 8th of May, 1989, based upon information provided to 
Officer Dennis Kordner and Detective Gary Caldwell of the American 
Fork Police Department, by one Joseph Horvath (hereinafter Horvath) 
over an extended period of time.(R. at 32 to 35). 
The Defendant, Ronald R. Koury, on the 22nd day of June, 1990, 
filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained by the Police as 
a result of their search, based upon a violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. The argument of the 
Defendant Ronald Koury was that Horvath was an agent of the police 
while conducting searches of Koury's residence. (R. at 88 to 96). 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, 
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on the 28th day of June, 1990. In that hearing Judge Christensen 
denied the Defendant Ronald Koury's Motion to Suppress, stating 
that the movant had failed to meet the burden of proof. (R. at 129 
to 131). 
On April 2, 1989, Detective Gary Caldwell received information 
from a confidential informant (Horvath) regarding a certain 
quantity of cocaine allegedly removed from the residence of Ronald 
R. Koury. (R. at 227) . From this time forward, Horvath was in 
contact with the police, specifically Officer Dennis Kordner and/or 
Detective Gary Caldwell, on a daily basis.(R. at 204). The police 
were well aware that during the period of time between April 2, 
1989 and May 8, 1989, Horvath was continuing to enter the home of 
Defendant Ronald R. Koury. (R. at 229). 
Horvath provided information to law enforcement officials 
based upon observations made while in the home of Ronald Koury, on 
several different occasions. (R. at 203). Law enforcement 
officials relied upon this information, at least in part, as a 
basis to commence an investigation of Ronald Koury, and continued 
to rely on this information in relation to their investigation. (R. 
at 216). Law enforcement officials relied on the information 
provided by Horvath to secure the search and seizure warrant of May 
8, 1989. (R. at 32 to 36). 
The police had knowledge of Horvath1s continued entrance into 
the home of Ronald Koury and did not instruct Horvath to continue 
or to discontinue his entrances into the home of Mr. Koury. (R. at 
4 
227). 
Horvath indicated to police contacts that he had permission 
to enter the residence of Defendant Koury, to feed Mr. Koury's fish 
and parrot. Horvath testified in the suppression hearing that he 
took care of Mr. Koury's animals when Mr. Koury left town. (R. at 
208, 216, and 229). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police in this case carried out vicarious searches on the 
home of Defendant Ronald Koury by way of their informant Joseph 
Horvath. Horvath was an agent of the police while conducting these 
searches. Said searches were conducted in violation of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as 
well as Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In 
addition, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has demonstrated 
a willingness to provide more extensive protection from search and 
seizure abuses by law enforcement by means of enhancing the 
protection of Article If Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
(INTRODUCTION) 
This appeal deals with the necessity of suppression of 
evidence obtained by law enforcement officials as a result of an 
illegal search and seizure, carried out by an agent of law 
enforcement. The applicable doctrine in regard to searches carried 
out by otherwise private individuals has been cited repeatedly in 
the State of Utah and across the country. 
I. THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION PROHIBIT 
UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES BY THE 
GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS WHEN 
COUPLED WITH GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
A. The Supreme Court of the United States has set out 
certain guidelines in relation to Fourth Amendment protections. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Said protections are 
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Any evidence obtained in violation of that 
amendment is inadmissible in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 3 67 U.S. 
643 (1961). In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), the 
Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment limitations upon the 
federal and state governments did not apply to searches by private 
individuals. 
When a private individual conducts a search, the general rule, 
as set forth in Burdeau, is that the Constitution does not reach 
said searches because they are not a product or result of 
government action. The general rule changes somewhat when there 
is some government action in relation to the otherwise private 
search. "In defining a private search, the Supreme Court has 
stated that the Fourth Amendment applies only if the private party 
xin light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded 
as having acted as an instrument or agent of the state.111 United 
States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 487 (1971)). The distinction between 
a private search and a governmental search has been considered in 
numerous cases. On the one extreme is the purely private act of 
an individual, to which the Fourth Amendment protections do not 
aPPiYf as set out in Burdeau. On the other extreme, in relation 
to searches, is the case where the government has initiated and 
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conducted the search, whereby the Fourth Amendment applies 
directly. The "grey area11 between the extremes is to be decided 
on a case by case basis with consistent application of the basic 
principles. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
B. It is within this "grey area" that the instant case 
presents itself to the Utah Court of Appeals. There was no overt 
and direct search and seizure by law enforcement prior to the 
warrant and arrest, as evidenced in the record. Nor was there a 
clearly private search, equally adduced from the record. The 
conduct involved necessarily requires an analysis of United States 
Constitutional provisions, as well as the specific Utah 
Constitutional provisions regarding search and seizure. 
The United States Supreme Court has extended the original 
doctrine of Burdeau in a number of cases in relation to private 
searches. It has set forth the necessary tests, to which the Utah 
Supreme Court has adhered, in finding governmental involvement 
relating to otherwise private searches. 
In United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, ((9th Cir. 1976) , the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the requirement of the 
Supreme Court that the Fourth Amendment protections apply to 
private searches only if the private party, "in light of all the 
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an 
instrument1 or agent of the state." (quoting Coolidae v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)). The determination of such 
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instrumental conduct has proven to be an intellectually interesting 
and challenging feat. In this instance then, Horvath must be 
considered to be an agent of the police in order for the Fourth 
Amendment protections to apply. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
also held that a private person cannot act unilaterally as an agent 
or instrument of the state; that there must in fact be some degree 
of governmental knowledge and acquiescence. Sherwin, at 6; United 
States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
Searches where governmental involvement is not as clear must 
be judged according to the nature of the governmental participation 
in the search process. United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767 (8th 
Cir. 1977). 
1) In the present case, Horvath has testified under 
oath that every time he entered the house of Ronald Koury, he 
discussed the "entrance" and the fruits thereof with law 
enforcement officials. (R. at 194). Additionally, Detective 
Caldwell also testified that the police were well aware of the 
continued entrance of Horvath into the privacy of Ronald Koury's 
home. The police received information from Horvath for a time 
period of approximately 34 days prior to obtaining a search and 
seizure warrant. (R. at 194 and 203) . Thus, at this level of 
inquiry, there appears to be, at a minimum, governmental knowledge 
of the informant Horvath's entrances into and subsequent searches 
of the home of Ronald Koury. 
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[w]hile 
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a certain degree of governmental participation is necessary before 
a private citizen is transformed into an agent of the state, de 
minimis or incidental contacts between the citizen and law 
enforcement agents prior to or during the course of a search or 
seizure will not subject the search to fourth amendment scrutiny." 
United States v. Walther. 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 
United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
"The requisite degree of governmental participation involves some 
degree of knowledge and acquiescence in the search." Walther, at 
792. It is the degree of governmental knowledge and acquiescence 
that must be determined in this case as a prerequisite to finding 
any agency relationship. As stated earlier, both Horvath (R. at 
194 and 203) and Detective Caldwell (R. at 229) expressly admitted 
that the police were aware, on a daily basis, of Horvathfs entrance 
and searches of the home of Mr. Koury. This would certainly seem 
to meet the requirement of governmental knowledge of the search. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon, in State v. Becich, 509 P.2d 
1232 (Or. 1973), was faced with a similar question. There a police 
officer directly observed the conduct of an informant, in removing 
certain stolen property from the defendants residence. The Court 
of Appeals cited Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
70 Cal.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969), in footnote 
3 of its decision, as follows: 
[T]he police need not have requested or 
directed the search in order to be guilty of 
xstanding idly by1; knowledge of the illegal 
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search coupled with a failure to protect the 
petitioner's rights against such search 
suffices. 
The Court in Becich found that such activity by the police officer 
"indicates somewhat more than casual connection and perhaps even 
some sort of supervision..." Becich, at 1234. As applied to the 
case at hand, the police did in fact stand idly by, acquiescing to 
the continued violation of Ronald Koury's rights. 
Walther, at 792, goes on to set out the critical factors1, as 
follows: 
[i]t is clear from the foregoing that two of 
the critical factors in the "instrument or 
agent" analysis are: (1) the government's 
knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent 
of the party performing the search. 
2) Regarding the first prong of the Walther standard, 
the knowledge and acquiescence of the government directly relates 
to the intrusive conduct of the person conducting the search. (See 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah 1988)). This portion of 
the analysis creates a significant hurdle for Ronald Koury, in that 
there is no direct evidence on the record to dispute Horvath's 
contentions that he had permission to be in the home of Mr. Koury. 
When asked whether Ronald Koury had asked him to feed his fish, 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically declined to 
define a standard for dealing with "instrument or agent" cases. 
Rather, it stated that the cases falling within the "grey area" 
could best be resolved on a "case by case basis, with consistent 
application of certain principles." Walther, at 791. It is this 
"consistent application of certain principles" that is the test 
focused in the present brief, (emphasis added). 
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Horvath stated that Koury had in fact asked him. (R. at 198) . 
When further pressed however, he was unable to recall the 
conversation or even the approximate date of any such alleged 
conversation. This testimony seems disingenuous when viewed in 
light of other portions of Horvathfs testimony. Horvath also 
testified that Ronald Koury had threatened his life, as well as the 
lives of his wife and children. (R. at 198). Horvath testified 
that his children would "take night watches...tak[ing] turns 
looking out the window to seen when Ron was coming to kill us." 
(R. at 200). Horvath further testified that this caused him 
tremendous concern. (R. at 201). However, in spite of this 
concern for the well-being of his children he continued to enter 
the home of Ronald Koury and to discuss the relevant discoveries 
of said searches with police. The basis for such inexplicable 
behavior was the desire to care for a few tropical fish. (R. at 
202) . 
The above-stated facts and testimony in conjunction with the 
following testimony reveal the attempted subterfuge of the reality 
of the situation. On cross examination, Horvath initially 
attempted to state that he had not had any conversation with police 
or the county attorney in regard to the nature of the suppression 
hearing. When pressed further, he stated that they had discussed 
"what we were here for." (R. at 214). Horvath denied having been 
horseshed by counsel or law enforcement, when in fact, at a minimum 
he had met with Sherry Ragan, the deputy county attorney, assigned 
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to this case, just prior to the hearing. (R. at 214). 
3) To the 2 prong of the Walther standard, the case of 
United States v. Snowadski, 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984), added 
that the intent of the private party must be to aid law enforcement 
efforts, rather than to further his own ends. From this it is 
apparent that the intent of Horvath is of importance in determining 
the status of Horvath at the time of his search. Horvath1 s 
testimony at the suppression hearing regarding his intent was 
varied. He seemed to imply that said searches and the delivery of 
a certain film container allegedly containing cocaine were a result 
of his fear of being implicated by Ronald Koury, in some illegal 
activity. (R. at 190) At other times, Horvath stated that it would 
certainly seem plausible to have informed the police as he did, in 
order to extricate Ronald Koury from a certain business in which 
the two were partners. (R. at 193). Further, Horvath testified 
that he would have had reason to implicate Ronald Koury in illegal 
matters, in order to protect himself and family from alleged 
threats Ronald Koury had made against he and his family. (R. at 
191 through 201). Any one and/or every one of these possibilities 
may in fact be true. However, there are also some very strong 
underlying implications surrounding the testimony of Horvath. Upon 
cross examination, he failed to come up with any plausible answer 
to the question put to him, as to why he would continue to feed the 
fish of a man who had threatened not only his life, but the lives 
of his wife and children. (R. at 202) . Upon examination of 
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Horvath's testimony, it would seem that Horvath was more concerned 
with the lives of a few fish than the lives of his family; yet he 
purports that said threats were very real and frequent. (R. at 
184, line 22; at 191, lines 14 through 25). The underlying reality 
seems to be that Horvath was taking such alleged risks, not to feed 
fish, as he claims, but rather to aid law enforcement officials. 
Accordingly, the necessary intent required, that of seeking to aid 
law enforcement officials, would seem to have been met. Horvath 
contacted the police initially, and stayed in contact with them 
during the course of their investigation and his continued searches 
of the home of Ronald Koury. His admissions of alternative 
motivations for aiding the police do not stand-up under any level 
of scrutiny. Why would a man in fear of his own life, as well as 
the lives of his wife and children, continue to enter the home of 
his alleged would-be assailant? The answer is simple: to aid law 
enforcement officials. 
Having met the requirements of the Walther test, finding 
governmental knowledge, acquiescence, or encouragement; as well as 
having demonstrated an intent to aid law enforcement officials, it 
necessarily follows that the searches and subsequent seizures by 
both the police and Horvath were in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, requiring 
a suppression of all evidence obtained therein. 
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II. VIOLATION OP THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
A. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has adopted many 
of the tests and holdings stated above. In State v. Newbold, 581 
P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972)(emphasis deleted; footnote omitted), the 
Court held that "[t]he protection of the Fourth Amendment is a 
restraint only upon the activities of sovereign authority and is 
not applicable to the searches and seizures by any persons other 
than government officers and agents." 
1) In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988), 
the Court stated that it had always considered the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution to be "one and the same." 
Accordingly, the analysis in Section I of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, of Appellant Kouryfs brief is 
directly applicable to the analysis of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. In addition, the Court in Watts followed the 
two tier approach, as set out above, that was followed in the 
Walther — Snowadski line of cases. 
B. Part of the Watts case dealt with whether an otherwise 
private search had taken on the color of a governmental search. 
The Court analyzed the holdings in Walther and United States v. 
Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1978), along with other leading 
cases dealing with this area of law. As applied to Watts, the 
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Court found that the Provo City police had in fact made an offer 
to the informant that if he would provide information leading to 
a "prosecutable case, a criminal case against him might be 
dismissed." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). The 
Court decided that such an "offer" was too vague to constitute 
governmental knowledge. Said conclusion was based upon the fact 
that the police were unaware of the eventual source of the 
information (Allan and Debbie Watts) and the fact that absolutely 
no direction was given or control exerted over, the informant. The 
search was conducted at the instance of police, but the police were 
unaware of any constitutional violation and they had not 
specifically directed the informant as to any specific search of 
any person or place. The offer made by the police was not premised 
upon a search, but rather the providing of information. 
1) The Watts case is thus distinguishable from the 
present case2 in that the police in the instant case were well 
aware of the continued entrance of Horvath into the home of Ronald 
Koury. (R. at 204). There is no mistake that the police knew and 
acquiesced in the extracting of information and evidence from the 
home of a specific person, Ronald Koury. 
2) The notion of intrusive conduct, as analyzed above, 
2Counsel for Defendant — Appellant Ronald Koury did not have 
the opportunity to distinguish State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1988), in written form prior to or at the time of the suppression 
hearing in that the prosecutor presented her memo citing the case, 
at the hearing rather than prior to the hearing. 
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directly applies at this juncture of the state argument. Although 
Horvath explicitly alleges that he had permission to be in the home 
of Ronald Koury, the facts and other testimony of Horvath indicate 
his attempted subterfuge of the truth. He claims to have, at the 
alleged request of Mr. Koury, continued to feed the fish of Ronald 
Koury, in spite of alleged threats by Mr. Koury to kill Horvath, 
his children and his wife. (R. at 200 to 202) . These allegations, 
made by Horvath are incongruent. Thus, although there is no direct 
evidence on the record, there is ample indirect evidence that the 
conduct of Horvath was in fact intrusive. 
3) Further, the Court found that the informant in the 
Watts case was motivated for reasons of his own, based upon the 
potential reward of escaping or avoiding criminal prosecution in 
another matter. As compared with the case at hand, Horvath, 
although testifying at the suppression hearing to any number of 
potential incentives, seems to have intended from the outset to aid 
law enforcement officials. This is evidenced by his initial 
efforts to contact the police and to deliver up what he thought to 
be cocaine. (R. at 188). Horvath's intentions to aid law 
enforcement are further evidenced by his continued entrance into 
the home of a man, that he claims had threatened to kill him, his 
wife and his children. The testimony that he did this to feed the 
fish belonging to Koury, at the potential expense of the death of 
his family is disingenuous. He clearly intended to aid law 
enforcement in securing the arrest of Ronald Koury. 
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4) There have been numerous cases nationwide, based 
upon the Walther test of governmental agency, that have found such 
agency and intent to aid the government on facts similar with those 
in the instant case. Cited earlier was the case of Stapleton v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70 Cal„2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969), wherein the Supreme Court of California 
dealt with the search of the defendant's home, by police and 
special agents, for certain credit card companies. In that case 
there was an explicit joint operation of law enforcement and 
otherwise private or non-government individuals. The private 
individuals unilaterally searched the defendant's car. All 
evidence obtained as a result of that search was held inadmissable, 
in spite of the lack of specific direction from the police to 
conduct such search. The status of the credit card agents did not 
revert to "private", merely because there was no specific direction 
regarding the search of the vehicle. 
In the case of United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 
1987), the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals presented a summary of 
"instrument or agent" cases in that circuit. A synopsis of those 
cases sheds significant light on the case at hand. In Knoll 
Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 397 F.2d 530 (7th 
Cir. 1968), the court found significant that the employee in 
question had taken certain documents for the purpose of turning 
them over to the FTC and the fact that the FTC had "knowingly 
approved of the employee's conduct by accepting the documents." 
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Feffer, at 738. The mere acceptance in Knoll Associates, Inc., was 
distinguished in United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823 (7th 
Cir. 1971), wherein the informant delivered documents that were 
considered to already have been within the informant's control. 
Thus, his intent of relaying the documents to government officials 
was not independent of other purposes of the informant, due to the 
fact that the informant was already the custodian of the documents 
in question. And finally, in United States v. Auler. 539 F.2d 642 
(7th Cir. 1976), which dealt with information gathered by the 
telephone company that was relayed to government officials, the 
court therein found that such surveillance had been conducted 
without government participation and for company reasons, rather 
than for aiding law enforcement. The aid to law enforcement came 
after the fact. The final result in Feffer was that the petitioner 
had failed to demonstrate that the intent of the informant was to 
aid the government; rather her intent was to avoid prosecution 
herself. (As in the Watts case) 
These cases further demonstrate the case by case factual 
analysis necessary for proper determination of the governmental 
participation as well as the informant's intent. As applied to 
the instant case, they contribute to the resolution of the case by 
indicating that government acceptance of information, which was 
intended to aid law enforcement meets both steps of the applicable 
standards set forth in Walther. 
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III. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS EXPLICITLY 
PROVIDED FOR THE EXTENSION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BEYOND 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988), the 
Supreme Court stated, in footnote 8, the following: 
In declining to depart in this case from our 
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret 
article I, section 14 of our constitution in 
a manner different from the fourth amendment 
to the federal constitution, we have by no 
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in 
some future case. Indeed, choosing to give 
the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an cippropriate 
method for insulating this state's citizens 
from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment 
by the federal courts. 
Additionally, Justice Zimmerman in his dissent in Watts, states: 
...I certainly do not agree with the 
categorical assertions in the majority opinion 
that this Court has "never drawn any 
distinctions" between article I, section 14 
and the federal fourth amendment and has 
"always considered the protections afforded to 
be one and the same" or with the majority 
opinion's intimation that there is no 
substantive distinction between the state and 
federal provisions. Several of our older 
cases may have language that supports this 
view, although none have pondered the question 
deeply, and some members of this Court may 
still agree with it, but I do not think this 
dictum expresses the views of all those 
joining in the Chief Justice's opinion, much 
less a majority of the Court. My view on this 
point finds support in footnote 8 of the 
majority opinion, which differs dramatically 
from the text referred to above. 
The Court opted not to extend or limit the perimeters of 
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article I, section 14 protections in the Watts case. The 
underlying policy for such an extension or limitation was stated 
in footnote 8 of the Watts case: as a method of protection for Utah 
citizens from inconsistent interpretations of the Fourth Amendment 
to the federal constitution. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution was passed in 
its original proposed form and without amendment or comment by 
order of the Convention dated May 8, 1889. See Official Reports 
and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the 
4th Day of March, 1889, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of 
Utah, page 319. As stated in Watts and other such cases, the 
Supreme Court has, for the most part, considered Article I, Section 
14 to be in line with the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. That the Court has been, in the past, unwilling to 
go beyond those specific protections provided therein is not 
disputed. That the Court may at some time in the future chose to 
extend said protections is a fact, stated by the majority of the 
Court and enhanced by Justice Zimmerman's dissent. 
In State v. Larocco. 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme 
Court demonstrated its willingness to diverge from the general 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the federal 
courts. The Court cited the Washington Supreme Court, which 
stated: 
Prior reliance on federal precedent and 
federal constitutional provisions [does] not 
preclude us from taking a more expansive view 
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of [the state constitution]where the United 
States Supreme Court determines to further 
limit federal guarantees in a manner 
inconsistent with our prior pronouncements. 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 
(1984) . 
The Court also stated that "[a]n increasing number of state courts 
are relying on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of 
their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional 
protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment." 
Larocco, at 465. The Court then goes on to cite a great number of 
cases from different states that are taking such action. The Court 
also cites People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.23 61, 544 
N.Y.S.2d 796 (Ct.App. 1989), stating: 
[W]e note that although the history and 
identical language of the state and federal 
constitutional privacy guarantees generally 
support a "policy of uniformity," this court 
has demonstrated its willingness to adopt more 
protective standards under the state 
Constitution "when doing so best promotes 
predictability and precision in judicial 
review of search and seizure cases and the 
protection of the individual rights of our 
citizens." 
The Court in Larocco elected to adopt such an expansionist view, 
finding that the warrantless search of the interior of an 
automobile was a violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. In part, such a divergence was a reaction to 
confusion on the federal level regarding interpretation of this 
area of law. 
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Ronald Koury hereby contends that such is the case in the 
present action. The "case by case" method of determination of 
search and seizure cases has led to a wide array of differing 
results. 
Clearly, there are strong policy arguments in favor of 
limiting constitutional provisions, such as the search and seizure 
protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 to the Utah Constitution, 
to governmental actions. The Jeffersonian ideal seems well served 
by such action. However, as stated in Watts and Larocco, extension 
of such protections are justified in protecting the citizens of 
Utah from the inconsistencies of federal decisions, as well as 
protecting the local citizens from law enforcement abuse of these 
constitutional protections we hold so dear. 
Law enforcement should not be permitted to do indirectly or 
vicariously what they are prohibited from doing directly. All that 
is occurring here is a circumvention of the search and seizure 
protections, by having a private citizen search the home of another 
private citizen, while law enforcement stands idly by, acquiescing 
to said search, while accepting the forbidden fruits thereof. 
In Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969), the Court cited the decision which 
led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, Entick v. Carrinqton, 
19 State Trials 1030, 1066 (1765). The language of Entick 
"enunciates a Hobbesian absolute right of privacy against all 
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intruders, official and private, not merely a Jeffersonian ideal 
of limited government." Such a concept is applicable to the 
notion of potential expansion of Utah constitutional protections. 
If the original basis for such protections were Hobbesian, Utah 
courts could thus find additional support for such expansions of 
protection, in addition to those already stated. As stated in 
Torres, the states may add further protections via their own 
constitutions, so long as they do not violate the federal 
constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Horvath was in daily contact with law enforcement officials, 
relaying information to them that he gathered from the home of 
Ronald Koury, as a result of his daily entrances and searches of 
Mr. Koury's home. Said entrances, in spite of Horvathfs 
contentions otherwise, did in fact constitute intrusive conduct, 
in which law enforcement did acquiesce and encourage, while 
standing idly by. Further, Horvath's intent was to aid law 
enforcement in arresting and convicting Ronald Koury. 
Such action is violative not only of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, but also of Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In addition, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has indicated the possibility of extending the 
protections of the Utah Constitution, beyond that of the federal 
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constitution. This case presents the Court of Appeals with such 
an opportunity to enhance the protection provided citizens of the 
State of Utah, from the abuses of government. Accordingly, 
Defendant Ronald Koury, respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals reverse the error committed by the District Court Judge, 
and grant the Motion to Suppress. 
. z/ 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of February, 1991. 
WAYN£/£. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief for Appellant, with postage prepaid thereon, were 
mailed to the office of R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 
this day of February, 1991. 
A^fp^/ 
wAyfrE B. WATSON, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, §14. 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
r , f RTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTA 
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INFORMATION FILED ON May 9, 1989 
FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING HELD ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HELD ON 
Appearing for State of Utah: 
Appearing for Defendant: 
BIND-QVEP ORDER 
DEFENDANT'S NAME: Ronald Koury 
Z 
'^W Clsii^ 





CRIME CHARGED: Unalwful Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia, Class 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony 
B c .i 
From the evidence presented at the preliminary examination the under-
signed magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime charged bes 
been committed and that the defendant committed the same. It is ORDERED i «*£ 
the defendant be bound over to answer said charge in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah on Friday ^ 
October 13 , 1989 at 8:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as may b- ncd 
BAIL: 
The Court continued the bail at $2,000.00 
Dated: September 13, 1989 
*/' 
This order and all pleadings in and records 
made of the proceedings in this caseinexcept 
tapes number 2177 
which have been retained subject to order of 
the District Court) transmitted to the Clerk 
of the District Court 
19 by the undersigned. 
?• ' • -WU 
Circuit Judge 
JKW 
WAYNE 3- WATSON, P.C. - 3405 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 696 N. University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD R. KOURY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Civil No. 891400352 
(Judge Christensen) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby requests the Court to suppress the evidence seized with a search 
warrant served on May 8, 1989 upon the residence of Ronald Koury for the 
reasons set forth in Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
filed herewith. This Motion is filed pursuant to Rule 4-501 UCJA. 
DATED this P^O- day of June, 199 
dZl& (ytUJ)^r t-&A. 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, to the following on the ^2- day of June, 1990: 
Sherry Ragan 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84 606 
V sttu^k (A ) OM^ 
S E C R E T A R Y I 
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WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. - 3405 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 69 6 N. University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 34604 
Telephone: (801) 3 75-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD R. KOURY, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Civil No. 891400352 
(Judge Christensen) 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration hereby submits 
the Point and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Suppress as 
follows: 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about April 4, 1989, informant Joseph Horvath spoke with 
officers Dennis Kordner and Gary L. Caldwell regarding threats he had 
been receiving from Defendant, Ron Koury. At this time, he also 
mentioned the Defendant's name in connection with distributing illegal 
narcotics. 
2. In Officer Caldwell's Probable Cause Affidavit, he states that 
Officer Kordner and Horvath were in daily contact since April 4, 1989, 
concerning this case. 
on Koury's telephone number as a result of the information given to him 
by Horvath to keep track of all phone calls made to or from the house, 
in order to keep track of Kouryfs whereabouts, 
4. On May 1, 1989, Horvath went to Koury's house to check the 
windows and feed the animals. In one bedroom, he observed what he 
thought to be residue from a line of cocaine, and in another room in the 
house, he observed what he thought zo be cocaine paraphernalia. Horvath 
went to the police with this information. 
5. Horvath entered Kouryfs house at least two more times between 
May 1 and May 8, 1989. The warrant to search Koury' s residence was 
issued on May 8, 1989. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Horvath was acting as an agent of the police. 
Black !s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines nagent,f as follows: 
One who represents and acts for another under the contract or 
relation or agency. One who undertakes to transact some 
business, or to manage some affair, for another, by the 
authority and on account of the latter, and to render an 
account of it. 
Mr. Horvath told the police, specifically Officer Caldwell and 
Officer Kordner, on April 4, 1989, that the Defendant was trafficking 
and distributing cocaine. Mr. Horvath had accurately informed police 
in the past and was considered, by Caldwell, to be a reliable informant. 
The police were in constant contact with Mr. Horvath concerning the 
whereabouts and activities of the Defendant from April 4, 1989, until 
the date the search warrant was issued. Mr. Horvath was acting under 
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the authority of the police in keeping track of Defendant and looking 
through the rooms in Defendant's house. If this were not the situation, 
why then would the police and Mr. Horvath be in daily contact? Police 
knew that Defendant had asked Horvarh to keep an eye on his house while 
he was our of town, and took advanrage of this to get Horvath to search 
through the house for evidence of the alleged trafficking and 
distribution. 
On May 1, 1989, while Mr. Horvath was supposedly looking through 
Defendant's house to check the windows, Horvath observed cocaine residue 
and paraphernalia and told the police what he had seen. Horvath also 
entered the house at least two nore times after May 1, 1989, to "check 
the windows and feed Defendant's pets.11 The police knew thar Horvath 
had access to Defendant's house and, therefore, used Horvath, as an 
agent, to do an illegal search in order to obtain probable cause for a 
legal search warrant. 
II. An informant's information must be considered reliable and 
apprised of the underlying facts and circumstances which show 
probable cause. 
The Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), established a 
two-pronged standard in obtaining a search warrant: 
1. The standard of reasonableness for obtaining a search warrant 
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based 
on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct 
personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be 
informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by 
the person providing the information and some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that 
the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was 
creditable or his information reliable. 
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Horvath first informed the police of the alleged wrongdoings of the 
Defendant on April 4, 1989. In a Preliminary Hearing, held on September 
13, 1989, Horvath told the Court that he and Koury were close friends 
and were partners in a body shop business from June, 1987, to December, 
1988. Horvath stated that he and ths Defendant had several arguments. 
Horvath also stated that Defendant Koury "threatened mine and my wife 
and kids1 life, I was concerned that he was going to inflict bodily harm 
on myself and my family . . , this guy is a mental case." United States 
v^_iiarris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), states: 
Recent case law has acknowledged that a different rationale 
exists for establishing the reliability of named citizen 
informers as opposed to unnamed police informer, who are 
frequently criminals. Those in the latter category often 
proffer information in exchange for some concession, payment, 
or simply our of revenge against: the subject; under such 
circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of their 
credibility or reliability. 
Horvath had some personal interest in Defendant's arrest, as he had been 
allegedly threatened many times and w^s worried for his and his family's 
lives. In their affidavit, the police testified that Horvath was a 
reliable informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 574 (1971) states 
that: 
reliability of the informant was not necessary, since the 
inquiry as to probable cause was whether the informer's 
present information was truthful or reliable. 
In light of Horvath fs relationship to Defendant, thoughts of his ow;n 
safety and gain may have influenced his information to be unreliable and 
given him motive to enter Koury's house to aid the police in their 
investigation. Horvathfs motive being to help the police catch Koury 
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before Koury carried out any of his threats. 
In addition, the fact that Horvath was an unnamed police informant, 
with possible ulterior motives, his information should be held to the 
higher level of scrutiny of United States v. Harris. 
III. An acting agent of the police is the equivalent of an employee 
of the police, which ~culd require the agent to obtain a 
search warrant before entering a suspect's house. 
In Pavton v. N.Y. , 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from entering a suspect's home 
without a warrant to make a routine arrest. The Court reasoned that 
these searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable, when the purpose is to search or seize an 
object or a person. Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United 
States states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) 
states that: 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and 
seizures, but rather against those which are unreasonable... 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, however, apply only 
to governmental action; a search or seizure, even if 
unreasonable, performed by a private person not acting as a 
government agent or in concert with a government official is 
not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
Horvath, as an agent of the police, was prohibited from entering 
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Defendant Kouryfs house without a warrant. Horvath entered Defendant's 
house several times after contacting the police with information 
regarding drug trafficking and distribution, and evidence obtained 
through Horvath after April 4, 1989 should be suppressed. Horvath 
continued entering the home and making observations on behalf of the 
police, thus demonstrating an agency relationship. Based upon the 
knowledge the police had of the relationship between Horvath and the 
Defendant, they took advantage of the situation by having Horvath 
conduct searches they could nor legally conduct themselves. Such a 
relationship must be considered one of agency due to the severe results 
upon Fourrh Amendment protections were the Court to rule otherwise. 
Horvath claims to be in fear for his own life and the lives of his 
wife and children, but asks the Court to believe that he continued to 
enter the house and feed the animals of his friend. It seems somewhat 
illogical to continue with such activities, when one is in fear for 
one's life. As an agent, Mr. Horvath would be able to implicate 
defendant in an action such as the present if he were to continue to 
provide information and surveillance to the police, which is exactly 
what he did. 
When the totality of the circumstances are analyzed, it is obvious 
that Horvath was an informant, he was acting at police suggestion, 
motivation, request, or the like. He informed police and continued to 
do so up to the time of arrest. It is a smear upon Fourth Amendment 
protections to allow the police to carry on an investigation through an 
informal agency relationship, obtaining evidence and subsequent warrant 
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and arrest, illegally, 
CONCLUSION 
The police are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from searching 
a person's home without a warrant. Horvath, as an agent of the police, 
is considered an extension of that body, and is bound by the same laws 
and limitations as the police. Horvath searched Defendant's house 
without a search warrant, under the supervision of the police, in 
violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the 
evidence found during any such searches, should be suppressed, as it was 
obtained in violation of Defendant's rights. To allow the police to act 
in such a manner as it violates the state and federal constitutions, 
would be a grave injustice. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of June, 1990. 
WAYtf^V. WATSON, P.C. 
Ati(o^ney for Defendant 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy o*f 
the foregoing, to the following on the XX- day of June, 1990: 
Sherry Ragan 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84 606 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 8914000352 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress on June 28, 1990. The Defendant 
was present with his attorney Wayne B. Watson and the State of 
Utah was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Sherry 
Ragan. After hearing evidence and considering the memoranda 
filed in the above-entitied matrer, the Court now makes rhe 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- Police officers for the American Fork Police 
Department, Dennis Cordner and Gary Caldwell, were aware that 
informant Horbath was going in and out of Defendant's place of 
residence and that he had access to Defendant's place of 
residence. 
2. Officers of the American Fork Police Department did 
not instruct informant Horbath to perform any duties on their 
behalf. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Despite the officer's knowledge of the informant's 
activities, the Court concludes that there was no intrusive 
conduct, since the informant had a right to be in Defendant's 
residence and was there at Defendant's request. 
2. The Court concludes that, although it appears that 
Mr. Horbath's motive for providing information was to effect the 
Defendant's arrest as a suspect in a crime, the intent of the 
person conducting any search in this matter does not make him an 
agent of the police. 
3. The Court concludes that the Defendant has not 
sustained his burden of proof, as required by State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) . 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the 
Court now makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
orders this matter set for trial. 
CLw DATED this \p ^ day of JrzSy? 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
W/ k^tOltZ^-^ih^ 
CULLEN V7 CHRISTENSEN 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
,y 
/S 
WAYNE B. WATSON 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herby certify that I mailed a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Wayne B. Watson, 2696 
North University Ave. Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604, this <5'u~; 
day of NJ-UJ-^K , 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
)SS 
!, the undersigned, Clerk of the Fourth District Court 
of Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that the 
znnsxed and foregoing is a true and full copy of an 
original doccr^ ient on tile in my office as such C)< 
''Vitness/ny^and and sea/of said Court) 
i^^LLLf^^ 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. - 3405 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2696 N. University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
TO APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER 
Case No. CR 89-352 
(Judge Christensen) 
COMES NOW defendant, petitioner herein, by and through counsel 
Wayne B. Watson of Watson, Scribner and Burrows, and requests permission 
from the above-entitled court to appeal from an interlocutory order by 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, in Utah County, as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant, hereinafter Koury, was arrested on May 8, 1989 for 
possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2. Said arrest was a result of a search warrant issued this same 
day, based upon information provided to the involved law enforcement 
officers by one Joseph Horvath over an extended period of time, 
3. Horvath and Koury have maintained a friendly lifelong 
relationship from their childhood in California. 
4. Both parties were involved in a business in the County of 
Utah, State of Utah. 
5. Horvath provided information to law enforcement officials 
based upon observations made while in the home of Koury on several 
different occasions. 
6. The police continued to permit Horvath to conduct surveillance 
inside Koury!s home looking for Koury and/or evidence, and encouraged 
Horvath to continue to act in an agency capacity without protecting 
Kouryfs Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
7. Horvath claims to have fed Koury!s animals in the past, while 
Koury was out of town and was continuing this practice when he 
discovered the evidence defendant seeks to suppress. 
8. Law enforcement officials were well aware of the actions being 
taken by Horvath, were informed of such on a regular basis and relied 
on said information. 
STATEMENT OF QUESTION OF LAW 
8. Whether law enforcement officials1 knowledge of and 
acquiescence to an informants entry into and search of a person's home 
is sufficient to establish agency, so as to employ Fourth Amendment 
protections, thus precluding law enforcement officials from vicariously 
conducting illegal searches and seizures? 
9. The issue of agency was raised by defense counsel in the 
suppression hearing on June 28, 1990. The trial court found no agency 
based upon a finding that there was no intrusive conduct. (Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order) 
STATEMENT OF NECESSITY OF APPEAL 
10 • An appeal of this interlocutory order should be permitted due 
to the hardship imposed on defendant Koury if such an issue is not 
2 
adequatley addressed, where it has been erroneously decided by the trial 
court. The issue of agency in this respect is of great constitutional 
import, wherein a decision favorable to Koury upholds constitutional 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government. If an appeal is not granted, Koury will be unjustly 
subjected to continued litigation in this matter. 
11. This appeal, if granted would certainly lead to an expedited 
termination of this litigation. A ruling by this court would likely 
result either in a dismissal of all charges against Koury based upon an 
unconstitutional search and seizure by the government or an expedited 
trial on the merits. 
WHEREFORE defendant petitioner respectfully requests that the 
above-entitled court grant permission to appeal. 
DATED this ' <? day of August, 1990. 
WAYNE p. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
3 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this £7 day 
of August, 1990: 
Sherry Ragan 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84601 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
Case No. Q £ ^ . 3 5 3 
COMES NOW the appellant, by and through his attorney of record, 
Wayne B. Watson of Watson, Scribner & Burrows, and hereby certifies that 
Appellant's Petition For Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 
at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, on the 29th day 
of August, 1990. 
WAYlffc/B. WATSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the 2^ day of August, personally appeared before me, Wayne B. 
Watson, Attorney at Law, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
the above documentation and the statements contained therein are true 
and correct to the best of his information and knowledge. 
IY PUBLK NOTAR IC/ 
Residing at. 
My Commission Expires: /Q - 2-5 ' *7V 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ronald Koury, 
Defendant and Acoellant. 
ORDER 
F J L E D 
OCT 21 IS9Q 
- « or I *#COL-* 
Case No. 900456-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Orme (On Law and Motion) . 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order, filed August. 27, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All 
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time required, 
for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 5(d). 
DATED this *?/5 day of October, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Nairman H. Jac lc^on , J u d g e 
CIRCUIT COr
 f STATE OF OTAHf COUNTY UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
: s s WARRANT 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) CASE NO. 
TO: AMERICAN FORK CITY OFFICER GARY L. CALDWELL AND ANY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN ASSISTANCE, GREETINGS: 
P roo f by A f f i d a v i t f having been submitted to me this 
day of May, 1989, that there is probable and reasonable 
cause to believe that there is presently located in the 
residence "located as set forth below, and the Court having 
found that there is, in fact, reasonable and probable cause 
for the issuance of this warrant, 
You, and each of you, are directed to conduct an 
immediate search of the following described residence: 
1. A residence, located at 11000 North 5058 West, 
Highland, Utah. The residence is a single family 
dwelling. The residence is a two-story dwelling 
of white brick construction. The residence is 
located on the north side of 11000 North. The 
residence has a garage on the east side. The 
residence has a chain link fence around the back 
yard. 
2 . A r e d 1987 Dodge, l i c e n s e number 865CNK o r any 
v e h i c l e t h a t Koury " i s d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e 
s e a r c h w a r r a n t . 
You a r e d i r e c t e d t o make a t h o r o u g h s e a r c h of s a i d 
p r e m i s e s and c o n t e n t s f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p e r t y : 
C o c a i n e ; c o c a i n e p a r a p h e r n a l i a ; money; r e c e i p t s ; n o t e s 
l i s t i n g drug d e a l e r s names and amoun t s owed; bank r e c o r d s ; 
t r a v e l r e c o r d s ; any o t h e r i t e m s used f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o r 
u s e of i l l e g a l n a r c o t i c s . 
I f you f i n d t h e same , o r any p o r t i o n t h e r e o f , you s h a l l 
r e t u r n i t p r o m p t l y t o t h i s c o u r t o r h o l d i t i n y o u r 
p o s s e s s i o n , p e n d i n g t h e f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h i s c o u r t . 
D a t e d t h i s & day of ? / % > * y 1 9 8 _ ^ L , a t 
THIS WARRANT EXPIRES TEN DAYS AFTER ITS ISSUANCE 
zifir ^v ""-
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OP UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 




5 0 5 8 West 11000 N o r t h 
H i g h l a n d , Utah 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF AND MOTION 
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 
CASE NO: 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH 





Gary L. Caldwell, being first 
deposes and says: 
duly sworn on oath, 
That I am a duly certified police officer for 
American Fork City Police Department, American Fork 
City, Utah County, State of Utah, and am currently 
assigned to the Detective Division of the American 
Fork Police Department. 
That I have been a police officer for the past ten 
years and have several years of experience in 
working with narcotics. For the past five years, I 
have been assigned directly to the narcotics 
division and have served as many as 53 search 
warrants dealing in illegal narcotics. Your 




also has experience in drug 
such as cocaine and marijuana. 
On April 4, 1989, your affiant was notified by a 
confidential citizen informant that Ronald R. Koury 
was trafficking cocaine between California and 
Utah. The informant advised your affiant that 
Koury was transporting cocaine through the state of 
Utah to distribute. 
Your affi, , ran checks on the cit. .n informant 
and found that the informant has known Koury for 
several years. The informant has not been charged 
with any criminal charges or any criminal 
convictions. Your affiant has learned that the 
informant's motivation for providing this 
information to the police is the concern that Koury 
is distributing illegal narcotics. Also, that 
Koury has his two small children living in his 
residence. 
The informant has provided information to your 
affiant on several different occasions about this 
suspect and other suspects that has proved to be 
100% reliable. Your affiant has checked out each 
piece of information that the informant has 
provided. The information has always been correct. 
Your affiant ran criminal history checks on Ronald 
Koury; and learned that Koury has been arrested and 
convicted several times for illegal narcotic 
trafficking in California. Koury is currently 
awaiting sentencing on a cocaine and marijuana 
distribution conviction in Buena Parkf California. 
Koury is out of jail on a $25,000 cash bail. 
Since April 4, 1989, your affiant and Sergeant 
Dennis Cordner from the American Fork Police 
Department has been in daily contact with the 
informant in this case. We have also been aware 
of the suspect's daily whereabouts. We have done 
this by the use of a pen register, which keeps 
track of all in and outgoing phone calls made by 
Koury. 
Your affiant has personal knowledge that Koury is 
dealing regularly with at least two people who have 
been convicted locally of distribution of 
narcotics. Your affiant is aware that Koury is 
also dealing with two to three other persons, who 
we believe are dealing in illegal narcotics. This 
information has been provided to your affiant 
through the use of the pen register, which is 
located at the American Fork Police Department. 
On April 21, 1989, your affiant started a pen 
register on Koury's telephone number. This pen 
register was authorized by a court order from the 
4th District Court in Provo. 
Your a f f i a n t h a s l e a r n e d from t h e i n f o r m a n t and 
from t h e pen r e g i s t e r t h a t Koury went t o C a l i f o r n i a 
and r e t u r n e d t o Utah t w i c e between A p r i l 4 t h and 
A p r i l 2 5 t h . On or a b o u t May 1 , 1 9 8 9 , Koury went 
back t o C a l i f o r n i a and i s due t o r e t u r n a t any 
time* On May 2 , 1 9 8 9 , your a f f i a n t l e a r n e d from 
two u n w i t t i n g i n f o r m a n t s , who gave i n f o r m a t i o n t o 
your a f f i a n t ' s i n f o r m a n t , t h a t Koury b r o u g h t back 
l a r g e amounts of c o c a i n e from C a l i f o r n i a on each of 
h i s t r i p s . Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t , when Koury 
r e t u r n s from C a l i f o r n i a , he w i l l i n p o s s e s s i o n of 
c o c a i n e . 
On May 1 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e i n f o r m a n t a d v i s e d y o u r . a f f i a n t 
t h a t , w h i l e c h e c k i n g K o u r y ' s r e s i d e n c e , he o b s e r v e d 
c o c a i n e and c o c a i n e p a r a p h e r n a l i a i n s i d e t h e 
r e s i d e n c e . The i n f o r m a n t has p r o p e r t y i n s i d e 
K o u r y ' s r e s i d e n c e . The i n f o r m a n t a l s o w a t c h e s 
K o u r y ' s c h i l d r e n o c c a s i o n a l l y . The i n f o r m a n t a l s o 
f e e d s K o u r y ' s a n i m a l s when Koury l e a v e s town. 
Ronald Koury owns a r ed 1987 Dodge, l i c e n s e number 
865CNK. The v e h i c l e i s r e g i s t e r e d t o Ronald 
Koury. Koury d r i v e s t h e v e h i c l e t o and from 
C a l i f o r n i a . Dur ing K o u r y ' s l a s t t r i p home from 
C a l i f o r n i a , he was s t o p p e d i n s o u t h e r n Utah by t h e 
highway p a t r o l and was i s s u e d a c i t a t i o n fo r 119 
m i l e s per h o u r . 
Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i s p r o b a b l e cause 
to b e l i e v e t h a t Koury i s t r a n s p o r t i n g and 
d i s t r i b u t i n g c o c a i n e i n Utah County , Utah . Your 
a f f i a n t a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t Koury i s c u r r e n t l y in 
p o s s e s s i o n of c o c a i n e i n h i s r e s i d e n c e , l o c a t e d a t 
5058 West 11000 N o r t h , H i g h l a n d , Utah . Your 
a f f i a n t a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t c o c a i n e i s b e i n g 
t r a n s p o r t e d i n v e h i c l e s . Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s 
t h a t Koury may be i n p o s s e s s i o n of c o c a i n e i n t h e 
1987 Dodge. 
Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t Koury i s a d a n g e r o u s 
p e r s o n . His c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y shows a r r e s t s f o r 
p o s s e s s i o n of i l l e g a l weapons and c o c a i n e 
t r a f f i c k i n g . Your a f f i a n t ' s i n f o r m a n t ha s been 
a d v i s e d by u n w i t t i n g i n f o r m a n t s t h a t Koury has 
t h r e a t e n e d them s e v e r a l t i m e s . Your a f f i a n t a l s o 
b e l i e v e s t h a t Koury ha s a s e r i o u s c o c a i n e h a b i t . 
17* Therefore, your affiant requests a warrant for the 
search of the stated residence for cocaine; 
cocaine paraphernalia; money used to distribute or 
possess cocaine; receipts? notes; paperwork showing 
the distribution or possession of cocaine; bank 
records; power bills; property showing that Koury 
is living at the stated residence. 
18. Your affiant also requests that he be allowed to 
enter this residence without first giving notice of 
our presence or intent to enter. Your affiant 
believes that the officers serving the search 
warrant may be in serious danger if not allowed to 




1 9 8 9 . TIME: 
SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 
s / DAY OF MAY 
CIRCUIT/COURT J 
^ ^ 
A What else did I tell him? 
Q Um-hum (yes), about Mr. Koury. 
A Specifically? Help me, I don't know what you are, 
what? 
Q How often did you talk to Officer Cordner about Mr. 
Koury just prior to the May 8th date when he was arrested? 
A How often did I? Not hardly at all. 
Q Okay, do you recall what kind of things you were 
telling him? 
A Once they started an investigation, I did not speak 
to him at all. At that time I had to speak with Gary 
Caldwell. Dennis would not talk to me as a friend or other-
wise. 
Q Okay. And when did that happen? 
A I don't know the exact day. 
Q All right. And what kind of things did you tell 
Officer Caldwell? 
A Oh, just, just different things, periods of time 
that Ron had been gone, and call up ranting and raving, and 
not taking his kids to school, and stuff like that. 
Q Okay. Why were you giving him that information? 
A Why? Because I had fear for my life. 
Q Did you know that they were doing an investigation? 
A Yes, ma'am, I did. 
Q Okay. And what was your understanding of what was 
u /r/ 
that Mr. Koury was arrested, having returned from California? 
A Yes. 
Q And so you are telling me, are you not, sir, that 
approximately some 34 days prior to that time you went into 
Mr. Koury's home ? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q And took some cocaine or something off the table, 
and put it in a film canister, and delivered it to the police 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you are telling us that you did not tell the 
police that he was trafficing in drugs or cocaine between 
Utah and California? 
A I didn't say anything like that. Maybe alleged, 
you know, that's --
Q What does that mean, "maybe alleged11? 
A Maybe I suspected it. How's that? 
Q Are you aware, sir, that Paragraph 5 of the Affi-
davit says that: "On April 4, 1989, your affiant was notified 
by a confidential citizen informant that Ronald R. Koury was 
trafficking cocaine between California and Utah. The infor-
mant advised your affiant that Koury was transporting cocaine 
through the State of Utah to distribute." The question is, 
are you aware that that's what Gary testified with the 
affidavit? 
A No, I'm not. But now I am. 
18 // 
A On or thereabouts, yes. 
Q On or about the 4th of April? 
A Well, it was a month or so before they arrested 
him. 
Q Oh, so at that particular point in time why did you 
think it necessary to take what you believed to be cocaine 
powder from Ron Koury's --
A Because I knew, I had been in his house, and I 
knew when he came back anyway he would blame it on me. 
Q At that particular time it was necessary for you 
to take any witnesses with you, was it? 
A When, in April? Yes. 
Q And you took Mr. Tanner with you that day? 
A I think that was the date that that Mr. Ken Tanner 
went. Every time I went in Mr. Kouryfs house when he wasn't 
there for about three months before he left, 1 had somebody 
with me. 
Q All right, but my question to is: On the 4th, when 
you took the cocaine and put it in the film canister, you 
took Mr. Tanner with you as a witness? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you did that so that Mr. Tanner would think 
you didn't plant this cocaine? 
A No, I didn't, didn't know that I would find any-














Why? Because Mr. Koury said he would implicate me 
Ling was ever found in his house. 
You had had a terrible falling out, had you not? 
On what date? 
Prior to April the 4th. 
Not that I know of. I mean, Ron came and went. He 
onger actively working with me,, 
Well, do you disagree with the use of, my use of 
the term "terrible falling out"? 
A No, I don't disagree with it. We had had a number 
of terrible falling outs. 
Q 
back in 
Well, in fact you just testified today, as you did 
September at the preliminary, that Mr. Koury had 
threatened your life, threatened the life of your wife and 










And that caused you great concern. Correct? 
Yes, sir. 
He was going to kill you and your family? 
Yes. 




Q And yet this man, who you went to the police be-
cause he was going to kill you and kill your family, you 
still took it upon yourself to enter his house to feed his 
fish? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, one way to stop these alleged threats from 
occurring would be to see that Mr. Koury was charged with 
some crime by the police, wasn't it? 
A Why? 
Q Wasn't it? 
A Well, that would be one way, yes. 
Q And in fact you were involved in a business deal 
besides the body shop, weren't you? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q A business called Constant Precision? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you were partners in that entity with the hopes 
of developing it into some sort of an aircraft parts assembly 
business for a larger manufacturer? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Who was the larger manufacturer? 
A Who was? 
Q Yes. 
A The larger manufacturer? Well, I've contacted 








am to this day. 
But at the time back in the 























spring of !89 you 
t you? 
And it was a real problem for you, was it not, 
have a partner who was, as you 
and your family? 
Yes. 
put it, 
And you didn't want that partnership 
Well, no, I didn't. 
Now, you went into Mr. Koury 
and, obviously, he was out of 
Um-hum. (yes) 
And how long, was he gone fr: 





I don't recall. 
's house 
town? 
Dm that p 
Well, you had some mixed emotions, I 
information about your friend 
d your business partner to the 
Yes. 
But it is fair to say, is it 
threatening 
to continue? 
on the 4th 
i 
eriod of time 
assume, about 
of twenty, twenty-five 
police. 
not, Mr. 
of your responsibilities was to advise 
Koury returned to town? 
No. I did, but it wasn't my 
































on with regards to drug trafficking. Right? 
A I didn't know what they had going. 
Q Well, you testified a moment ago on direct examin-
ation, did you not, sir, that you knew an investigation had 
begun into his alleged drug activity? 
A No. My testimony was I assumed an investigation 
had begun. 
Q How come, how did you assume that? 
A Well, if evidence is provided to them, I would j 
assume they'd follow up on it. 
Q Well, you had repeated conversations with the j 
police between the 4th of April and the 8th of May, didn't 
you? ! 
A Yes. 
Q In fact every time between that period that you 
went into Ron Koury's house, between the 4th of April and 
the 8th of May, you would talk to the police about what you 
had seen there and what you had observed. Right? 
A Yes. 
Q And one of the things that you would report to them 
was it not true, sir, was that Mr. Koury was still not home? 1 
A Yes, that would be one of the things. 
Q Well, why would it be important to you to relate 
to the police whether or not Mr. Koury had returned from 
California? j 
24 
A I just, that's just, I mean if I went in his house 
and he was there, I would tell him that too. 
Q Okay, but isn't it a fact that you believed and 
you discussed with the police that Mr. Koury might bring back 
some large cocaine shipment? 
A I had no idea. 
Q Isn't it a fact that that was the reason for the 
delay of the search warrant uses, from the 4th of April until 
the 8th of May, because they hoped that: he would have arrived 
l 
back with cocaine and when the search warrant was executed j 
there would be a large quantity or supply of cocaine in the ; 
residence? I 
A I have no idea. | 
! 
Q You are telling, now I'm not asking your idea, my 
question to you is: Isn't it a fact that you discussed that 
with the police? 
A That I discussed the fact? What fact? 
Q That the police wanted to know when he was back 
because they suspected when he returned from California he 
might bring a large quantity of drugs? 
A No, sir. That was never in the conversation. 
Q Okay. You never talked about that? 
A Hum-urn, (no) 
Q How many times do you think you talked to Detective 
Caldwell between 4 April and 8 May? 
25 If 
A I don't recall. 
Q Give me your best estimate. 
A Oh, maybe eight or ten times. I have no idea. 
Q And how many times do you think that you talked 
to Officer Cordner between 4 April and 8 May? 
A I have no idea. 
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s still gone, 
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there working 
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Idea when Koury was 
direct examination 
2 6 ll(=> 
some ten minutes ago that you never talked to Cordner from 
4 April until 8 May, cause Detective --
A Not in regards to Koury. 
Q Let me finish my question. 
A Okay. 
Q Do you recall testifying a moment ago on direct 
examination that between 4 April, when you first told them 
about the cocaine and took some to the police, and 8 May, 
that you never talked to Detective Cordner after that? 
A Yes. 
Q It was all conversation with -- Caldwell? 
A Well, except for doing his car, you know. I mean, 
now that we have been sitting here recalling this period of 
time, it comes to light in my mind that during that period 
of time I fixed Detective Cordner's car. 
Q Okay, so would you like to change your testimony 
with regard to the conversations that you had before? 
A Yes. I would say that I would change my testimony, 
because while I was fixing Dennis1 car I did have occasion 
to talk to him regularly; however, not about the Koury case, 
it was about his car. 
Q Now, the bird wasn't there, the parrot; Ron has a 
parrot, doesn't he? 
A Um-hum. (yes) 
Q The parrot wasn't there on the 8th of May, was it? 
27 
1 I A No. 
2 Q And the animal that you used to feed was the parrott 
3 I - A And the fish. 
4 Q You fed, you used to feed the parrot? 
5 A And the fish. 
6 1 Q I'll get into the fish in a minute. 
7 I A Okay. 
8 Q You used to feed the parrot? 
9 A Yes, sir. 
10 I Q Now, Ron Koury, the man who allegedly threatened 
11 I to kill you and kill your family, when he left Utah prior to 
12 the 4th of April, never asked you to feed those fish, did he? 
13 A Yes, he did. 
14 Q Tell the Court the meeting when he asked you to 
15 feed the fish? 
16 A I don't recall the exact conversation. 
17 Q Give me your best estimate, and relate it to the 
18 4th of April of '89? 
19 A And relate it to the 4th of April, what is, was 
20 that the date when Ron Koury left? 
21 Q Well, that's the day that we have established that 
22 you went into the house and saw what you believed to be 
23 cocaine residue, put it in a film canister and took it to 
24 the police. 

































That ' s co r r ec t , r igh t? 
Urn-hum. (yes) 
Now, prior to that time Mr. Koury left Utah. Right?j 
No. 
He was still in town? 
Well, he had left for one of his visits to 
alifornia. 
Q In fact his dad was seriously ill and passed away 
in December? 
A Well, for whatever reason, yes. 
Q Well, you know that is a fact, don't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And he would go down to visit his father, who was 
seriously ill or deathly sick, in fact died in December of 
'89? 
A I don't know about that. 
Q But you know that his dad was seriously ill? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q And that was one of the reasons he would go to 
California and visit with his father? 
A Well, let's just say that there was occasion when 
he was gone when his kids stayed with me that they called 
their grandparents and he had not visited their house? 
Q My question was, that was one of the reasons that 



























A Yes, that was one of his reasons. 
Q And what were the other reasons? 
A I have no idea. 
Q The traffic in cocaine? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Did you tell the police there or did you assume? 
A I assumed he had reasons to go. 
Q My question, did you tell the police or did you i 
not tell the police that one of the reasons he went to 
California was to bring back cocaine to sell in Utah? 
A I told the police that he had to be getting money 
somewhere, and knowing his past history that that would 
i 
probably be a good assumption to make. J 
Q Okay. Now, you were afraid of Ron Koury returning 
to Utah, weren't you? 
A No, I wasn't afraid of Ron Koury returning to Utah. 
Q Well, did you feel that you were constantly on 
the lookout at your, at the preliminary hearing? 
A Yes. Well, actually, my kids were constantly on the 
lookout. They used to take night watches. Because they had 
been there when these heated discussions, when Mr. Koury 
threatened to kill me and my family. They had overheard 
this. So my kids used to take turns looking out the window 
to see when Ron was coming to kill us. 
Q And that I imagine would cause a father tremendous j 
30 
concern. 
A Oh, yes. 
Q About the safety of his children, and perhaps 
concern about their psychological well being. Would it not? 
A You bet. 
Q Now, didn't you want Ron Koury arrested so that he 
wouldn't be out there intimidating your children? 
A At this time, yes. 
Q So wasn't one way to get Ron Koury arrested to 
immediately notify the police that he's back in town? 
A I did not notify the police at anytime that he was 
back in town. 
Q I didn't suggest you did, sir. I said, wasn't one 
way for you to eliminate that problem chat your children 
were suffering was as soon as you knew Ron Koury was back in 
town, you would have advised the police, wouldn't you? 
A No. 
Q You wouldn't have called the police to say he's 
back? 
A I would have said, well, we had a business going, 
and when he made these trips, before his return there would 
be an abnormal amount of phone calls, so I knew that he was 
due back in teh next day or two. I would feed the fish and 
feed the parrot until I seen or heard that he was there. 
Q Okay. After the 4th when you found this cocaine, 
31 Jio( 
of April, when you found the cocaine and took it to the 
police, why would you go back in his home after that? 
A Well, I guess I'm just, I wouldn't let the animals 
die just because of his connection to them. You know, that's! 
the kind of person I am, Ifm sorry. 
Q Well, why wouldn't you? We are talking about, 
what, two or three tropical fish here? 
A Well, whatever. 
Q Well, ho^ ? many? 
A If it's something that you take care of on a daily 
basis, maybe ten or twelve, there's no reason to let them 
die because, because he walks away and leaves them. It was 
my responsibility for a year before that to take care of them 
when he was gone. 
Q Tell me how many fish we are talking about? 
A Oh, maybe a dozen. 
Q And they are tropical fish in a fish tank? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, if the man had threatened your wife, threatened 
your kids and you and you had already turned the cocaine in 
to the police, why isn't it just as easy to put the fish 
into a can instead of constantly going back into Mr. Kouryfs 
house? 
A I guess I'm not as fast thinking as you are. Why 



























THE COURT: Well, you just answer his 
Watson) Did you, you told Officer Cordner 
going back in to feed the fish, didn't you? 
the police knew that you were going back into 












you told them? 1 
i 
tell Detective Caldwell that as well as | 
1 
i 
also have personal property in this house, 
the affidavit for the search warrant says that 
cocaine in a film canister that you delivered 
on the 4th of April, but it says that: "Since,', 
reading from Paragraph 9, ''April 4, 1989, your 










has been in daily contact with the infor-
11
 That's true, is it not? 
., it's now, what date is this? 
;ays, 
the 
this affidavit says, for your information, 
8th day of May. And Paragraph 9 thereof 
33 A^: 
says that both Detective Caldwell and Sergeant Cordner were 







That's true, isn't it? 
Well, yes, I would say almost every day. 
Now it says that you provided information to the 
police on several different occasions about this suspect and 
other suspects that had proved to be 100 percent reliable. 





No, I'm not. 1 
And that's not true, is it, sir? | 
Well, it's true. ! 
1 
1 I 
Do you recall me asking you whether you were a j 
i 











And you told me you were not? 
I was not. 
So you were not a police informant in 1988. Is i 
correct? 
No, I wasn't. [ 
And you were not a police informant in 1989. Is 
correct? 
In 1989 I had several occasions of people trying 
to sell me drugs, and it was reported each time to --
34 JOW 
A I have no idea. That may have been one of the 
days I went. 
Q Now, Paragraph 13 of the Affidavit says: fl0n May 
1, 1989, your informant advised your affiant that, while 
checking Koury's residence, he observed cocaine and cocaine 
paraphernalia inside the residence. The informant has prop-
erty inside the Kouryfs residence. The informant also watches 
Kouryfs children occasionally. The informant also feeds 
Koury' s animals when Koury leaves town.'1 
A Yes. 
Q So does that refresh your recollection as to being 
in there on May 1st? 
A Yes. I was, I was probably in there feeding the 
fish on the 1st. When I fed the fish I walked through the 
whole house, checked all the windows and everything. 
Q Okay. So you saw, as you testified, some white 
powder dust on a dresser top? 
A Yes. 
Q And it appeared to you, as you testified, that 
someone had done a line of cocaine, snorted with a straw or 
something, and left the residue? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, what was any different on May 1 than April 4? 
A On May 1 and April 4th? I think on April 4th there 
was a lot more residue. 
38 :c< 
or Dennis, it probably would have come up in conversation. 
I don't recall, you know, exactly. 
Q Did the police ever tell you not to go back in 
there? 
A The police never told me to or not to go in there 
at any time. 
Q Well, you have had conversations, certainly, with 
the police with regard to the theory of defendant's case; 
"agency," you've heard that term before, haven't you? 



















Are you aware of the fact that I'm here today 
establish that you are an agent of the police when 
nducted these searches? 
is 
ust 
Yes, I'm aware of that. 
And you have had conversations with Ms. Ragan 
that --
No. 
In fact you had a conversation with her out in the 
before this proceedings started? 
At that time I asked her what we were here for. 
And you talked about agency? 
Weil, she just told me what we were here for. 






He would just say, "Im going to be gone for a few 
will you 
and the b: 
Now, 












take care of the house," which included the 
Lrd. 
during that 34-day period, where you had this 
contact with Cordner and Caldwell, as you've 
would tell them when you fed the fish? 
And when you'd go into the house? 
Yes. 
And if for, if it were appropriate, you would tell 
"Koury's in town," "Koury's not in town," what have 
Yes. 
So there's no question that the police knew of your 









it's, I did not go to his house daily. 
every two or three days? 
My point is, there is no question that the 





And we have established, have we not, sir, that 
you would have 
A Well 









































I can make th 
ty of the 
time ever 
what I was 
received 
Okay 
him any instructions. | 
him to look for drugs in the home? 
is real easy. Because of the sensi-
Title 3 that we planned on doing, I never at 
gave Mr. 
doing. 
Horbath any information. I didn't tell 
I didn't tell him to do anything. I | 
information from him. 
Prior 
you determine that 




as he got 















to serving this search warrant, how 
the defendant was back in town, that | 
Started making calls probably as ' 
( 
! 
I RAGAN: I don't have anything further] 
i 
COURT: Any cross, Mr. Watson? 





dwell, Mr. Horbath apparently brought 
ity of cocaine on or about the 4th of April 
correct? 




t know if 
Cordner. 
you had a 
e honest 
been April the 2nd, 1989. He gave 
test for that? 
with you, I forgot all about that. I 1 




























Q And you knew, did you not, that Horbath was going 
back and forth into the residence? 
A I could, yes, probably, I probably. 
Q Did you know that he was telling he was feeding 
some fish and some birds? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Now, just briefly, in your affidavit 
in support of a search warrant, in Paragraph 5; did Horbath 
or did he not tell you as alleged, that Koury was trafficking! 
cocaine between California and Utah? 
A Yes, he did. j 
Q And the confidential informant that we referred to j 
or confidential citizen, or whatever term you used, is 1 
Horbath, in everyone of these paragraphs. Right? 
A I'll have to check right quick. 
Q Well, I'll handle them one at: a time. Paragraph 
5, you say: "On April 4, 1989, your affiant was notified by 
a confidential citizen informant that Ronald R. Koury was 
trafficking cocaine between California and Utah." And that 
was Horbath. Right? 
A That is. 
Q Now, that was the 4th or the 2nd of April? 
A I, I believe that that was the 2nd of April. 
Q So that day may just be a mistake. Is that cor-
rect? 
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